Abstract: Proofs of Retrievability (PoR) is one of the basic functions of electronic evidence preservation center in cloud. This paper proposes two PoR schemes to execute the workflow of evidence preservation center, which are named Finer Grained Proofs of Retrievability (FG-PoR) and More Lightweight Proofs of Retrievability (ML-PoR). The two PoR schemes do not use multi-replication technology or erasure code technology, but employ the verification tags and signatures to implement provable data possession and data recovery dual functions. When some data blocks have been lost in Archive Storage Area (ASA), FG-PoR can recover each data block of evidence matrix, but ML-PoR can only recover a column of evidence matrix. The analysis results show our two PoR schemes do not only provide the integrity verification guarantee but also have robust recovery guarantee to electronic evidence in cloud. The two schemes can allow for lower computation and storage costs than other similar schemes; moreover, ML-PoR can provide lower costs than FG-PoR.
Introduction
In a general operating environment, electronic evidence is derived from systematic data and network data. Systematic data include system logs, audit records, temporary or hidden files, hard disk drive exchange partition, etc. Network data include logs of firewall, Intrusion Detection Systme (IDS), and router, E-mail information, real-time chats, network monitoring records, etc. Electronic evidence may provide massive information and resource bases in various forms. In cloud computing environments, it provides users with flexible services in a transparent manner. One fundamental aspect of service is that data is being centralized or outsourced into a "cloud", which is a collection of devices and resources connected through the Internet. Electronic evidence is a special kind of data, and it must be integrated before it is sent to a court of law. When it is being collected from the cloud, it should be fixed in a specific form and stored safely on the local or cloud server so as to prevent them from being destructed by nature and man. This operating process is called electronic evidence preservation [1] .
Cloud forensics is a cross discipline of cloud computing and electronic forensics. Cloud computing is a shared collection of configurable networked resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications and services) that can be reconfigured quickly with minimal effort [2] . Electronic forensics is the application of computer science principles to recover electronic evidence for presentation in a court of law [3] . Cloud forensic investigations are likely to involve evidence acquisition, preservation and analysis in a cloud. From the investigators' perspective, storing electronic evidence remotely in a cloud in a flexible, on demand manner brings appealing benefits: relief of the burden of storage management, access to data with independent geographical locations, and avoiding capital expenditure on hardware, software and personnel maintenance [4] . Also, it can reduce the litigants to the objectivity of the evidence, simplify the review procedure of evidence in court, and effectively assess the fairness and justice in the administration.
While cloud computing makes these advantages more appealing than ever, it also brings new and challenging security threats to the outsourced electronic evidence. On one hand, electronic evidence has its own vulnerability, such that it can more easily be deleted, forged, altered and removed than traditional printed evidence. On the other hand, cloud computing is open and has a virtual operation environment for all users. When the outsourced electronic evidence is stored to a cloud, it might be unclear as to where evidence is processed within the cloud, and such processing might occur in different jurisdictions. Once electronic evidence is extracted from the cloud and is sent to the court, it must be true, reliable and integrated, in accord with legal requirements [5] . So how to ensure the integrity of electronic evidence in cloud is a considerable challenge to both cloud service providers and research institutes.
Related Work
When the users send their data to the Cloud Storage Server (CSS), they should pay a fee to obtain an appropriate storage space to preserve their data. The CSS is not fully trusted because the storage devices are under the control of the Cloud Service Provides (CSP), not the users. The importance of ensuring the integrity of data in untrusted storage servers has been highlighted by some researchers, and they have proposed two basic schemes to check the availability and integrity of cloud storage data. The two basic schemes are called provable data possession (PDP) [6] and proofs of retrievability (PoR) [7] . A PDP scheme can only verify the integrity of a file on the server, but cannot ensure the retrievability of a file [8] . However, a PoR scheme is a challenge response protocol. In the protocol, the server can demonstrate to the client that a file is intact and retrievable without any loss and corruption.
The provable data possession (PDP) scheme was built upon by Ateniese et al. [6] . In the scheme, the user could utilize RSA-based homomorphic tags to challenge the server. The server proved possession of the file by sending back a few randomly sampled blocks of the file. In a subsequent study, Curtmola et al. [9] described a multiple replica PDP (MR-PDP) scheme, which ensured that multiple replicas of the user's files were stored at the untrusted storage server. Barsoum [10] constructed two efficient multi-copy PDP (EMC-PDP) protocols which were called Deterministic EMC-PDP (DEMC-PDP) and Probabilistic EMC-PDP (PEMC-PDP). PEMC-PDP depended on spot checking by validating a random subset of the file blocks instead of validating all the blocks in DEMC-PDP to reduce computation and storage overhead.
The proofs of retrievability (PoR) scheme was first proposed by Juels et al. [7] , and this scheme used spot-checking and error-correcting codes to ensure both "possession" and "retrievability" of the files on remote servers. Shacham and Waters [11] also proposed a PoR scheme. In this scheme, the file was encoded using erasure code and was split into some blocks. The server used homomorphic algorithm to compact all data tags into a short tag, and it was taken as the response to the client. Bowers et al. [8] introduced a retrievable scheme for cloud storage data, which permitted a set of servers to prove to a client that a stored file was intact and retrievable. In [2] , Cong Wang et al. utilized the homomorphic token to ensure the integrity of erasure-coded data with additional feature of data error localization. In a subsequent work, Qian Wang et al. [12] allowed a third party auditor to verify the integrity of the data stored in cloud based on Merkle hash tree.
To cloud forensics, several works have already been published in this field. Wolthusen [13] noted that when attempting to locate evidence in a distributed and complex environment such as the cloud, the distributed and virtual nature of the cloud would likely increase the difficulty of evidence collection, making tracing activity and re-construction of evidence more challenging. Grispos et al. [14] analyzed how established digital forensic procedures would be invalidated and discussed several new research challenges in the cloud environment. Birk and Wegener [15] assessed whether it was possible for the customer of cloud computing services to perform a traditional digital investigation from a technical point of view. Furthermore, they discussed possible solutions and possible new methodologies helping customers to perform such investigations.
In above works, literature [6, 12] were the PDP schemes. They could only check the integrity of the file through the server sending back random samples of the file. Literature [2, 7, 8, 11] were all the PoR schemes based on erasure codes. They used erasure codes technology to compact many data blocks into fewer redundancy. This approach added storage costs of redundant data and computation costs of encoding and decoding. Literature [9, 10] were the PoR schemes based on multiple replica. In the two schemes, each data object needed to be created some copies, and the size of data objects and their copies were the same. Unfortunately, the storage costs of the copies in the two schemes was too high. Literature [13, 14] discussed the potential benefits and challenges of cloud computing for electronic forensic investigations. Literature [15] mentioned possible solutions and methodologies of technology to face the challenges. But these three papers [13] [14] [15] did not all provide technical detail on how to solve the problem. This paper proposes two verification schemes of retrievability for preservation of electronic evidence in cloud computing environment. The two schemes are kept light-weight by employing verification tags and signatures with neither the use of erasure codes nor the use of mutiple-replica.
An Electronic Evidence Preservation Center in Cloud
Due to outdated equipment and the lack of technical support, it is impossible that electronic evidence could be preserved perfectly by the courts or the public security organs. This means electronic evidence will usually be stored in a special preservation center. In general, a traditional electronic evidence preservation center uses some technologies, such as encryption algorithm, digital signature, time stamp and digital digest to ensure the security of electronic evidence [1] . In a cloud computing environment, except for these conventional technologies, privacy protection, PDP and PoR technologies should be considered in a preservation center. This paper designs two PoR schemes for application in a cloud preservation center for electronic evidence. The architecture of the electronic evidence preservation center is shown in Figure 1 . From Figure 1 , the preservation center contains multiple functional areas: Center Management Area (CMA), Classification Preservation Area (CPA), Archive Storage Area (ASA), Evidence Recovery Area (ERA). When Law Authorities or Users (LAU) send electronic evidence to the preservation center, they only interact with the CMA, so it will greatly improve the work efficiency.
Center Management Area (CMA)
In the electronic evidence preservation center, electronic evidence would be stored using a classification storage method by the CPA. Each evidence file is divided into fixed-size chunks, and ASA will store these chunks. Each chunk will be assigned a label at the time of creation. The CMA stores all metadata associated with classification evidence. Also, the CMA provides the services of electronic evidence reception, notary and forensic services for the law authorities and users (LAU), which is an external service window of the electronic evidence preservation center. Moreover, it executes business process supervision and coordination and management to other function areas. It will be taken as a Trusted Audit Center (TAC) in our PoR schemes.
Classification Preservation Area (CPA)
If the CMA has received electronic evidence from the LAU, it will forward the evidence to CPA to store temporarily. When electronic evidence has been collected from selected mobile devices, including mobile phones, MP3/4, PDA, etc., it will be recorded as mobile terminal equipment evidence to be preserved. When electronic evidence is extracted from computer systematic data, including a system log, audit records, temporary files, exchange files, or hidden files, it will be recorded as computer system evidence to be preserved. When electronic evidence has been collected from all kinds of private computers, notebook computers, storage servers, or the hard drives of this equipment, it will be collected as hardware equipment evidence to be preserved. Electronic evidence may be attained from network servers and hosts, such as webpage browsing historical records, cookies, favorites, cache information, etc. It may also be attained from network communication data including logs of firewalls, IDS, routers, Email information, real-time chat and network monitoring records, etc. This evidence will be recorded as online network evidence to be preserved. After electronic evidence has been classified over a long time span in the CPA, it will be divided into chunks to be sent to the ASA. The CPA will store the metadata of all chunks, such as the tables, mapping the labels to chunk locations.
Archive Storage Area (ASA)
In this area, there are some Chunk Storage Servers (CSS) 1 2 , , , n A A A  in the cloud. These servers will store all chunks of the evidence file, and each chunk is split into some blocks. In FG-PoR schemes, each block has a corresponding tag, and all blocks and tags will be stored in the ASA. The ASA will provide safe, reliable, efficient storage services for massive electronic evidence in the cloud. When the CMA asks the CPA about the integrity of a stored evidence file, the CPA will query the metadata for the locations of the desired chunks and construct proofs of retrievability to prove that the file is intact and retrievable.
Evidence Recovery Area (ERA)
When the LAU needs their electronic evidence, it sends a request message to the CMA. The CMA accesses the chunks of evidence file by querying the CPA for the locations of the desired chunks; if the chunks are not being operated on, the CPA replies with the locations, and the CMA then contacts the ERA. The ERA retrieves the evidence from CSS 1 2 , , , n A A A  , and uses hash function to check the integrity of the evidence file. Then it sends the evidence to the CMA, and further forwards it to the LAU. The CMA could also check the integrity of the evidence file by running verifying algorithm VeriResp( ). If the ERA or the CMA has found some error data blocks of the evidence matrix, the ERA will use the retrieved algorithm RetrData( ) to recover these data blocks.
Proofs of Retrievability for Electronic Evidence
From Figure 1 , we know that CPA, ERA and CMA will coordinate to ensure the integrity and retrievability of electronic evidence. Moreover, the CMA will play the role of Trusted Audit Center (TAC) in collaboration. The workflow of LAU, CPA, ASA, ERA and CMA as the five functional areas is shown in Figure 2 . Figure 2 . The workflow of five functional areas. "Send( )" means that the sender sends the evidence file to the receiver; "Requ( )" means that the sender sends the request message to the receiver; "Chal( )" means that one side sends the challenge message to the other side; "Resp( )" means that one side sends the response values to the other side; "Query" means that the CPA or the ERA queries chunks of the ASA; "Feedback" means that the ASA gives feedback messages of chunks and blocks.
In our work, we provide two PoR schemes: Finer Grained Proofs of Retrievability (FG-PoR) and More Lightweight Proofs of Retrievability (ML-PoR) to execute the workflow of the electronic evidence preservation center. There are six algorithms in the three functional areas of CPA, ERA and CMA. The CMA has three algorithms TagSigGen( ), KeyGen( ), and VeriResp( ); the CPA has an algorithm RespGen( ); the ERA has two algorithms RetrData( ) and VeriHash( ). These six algorithms will be described in Section 4.1. It is assumed the LAU has an evidence file B and will send it to the ASA to store. The CMA will send challenge message Chal( ) to the CPA so as to make regular checks on the integrity and availability of electronic evidence at appropriate intervals. The CPA will query the metadata for the locations of the challenged chunks and compute response values to send back to the CMA. When the CMA has found out some data blocks are incorrect, it will tell the information to the ERA, then the ERA uses retrieved algorithm RetrData( ) to recover electronic evidence. When all incorrect data blocks have been recovered, the ERA will send them back to the ASA again.
Notation and Preliminaries
Let B be an electronic evidence file: it is divided into n chunks, and each chunk is split into m blocks: 
In execution processes of the workflow of five functional areas, our two schemes FG-PoR and ML-PoR both consist of six algorithms. We start with the precise definition of FG-PoR scheme and ML-PoR scheme. Definition 1. FG-PoR scheme and ML-PoR scheme are both collection of six polynomial-time algorithms (KeyGen, TagSigGen, RespGen, VeriResp, VeriHash, RetrData) such that:
( , ) pk sk  KeyGen( ). This algorithm is run by the CMA to generate public key pk and private key sk . 
Nyberg-Rueppel Signature Scheme
The Nyberg-Rueppel signature scheme first appeared in the literature in [16] , named after its authors K. Nyberg and R.A. Rueppel. Its security is based on the intractability of discrete logarithm problem. Camenisch et al. [17] described this scheme as follows:
The parameters consist of a prime p , a prime factor q of To 
Finer Grained Proofs of Retrievability (FG-PoR)
We propose two schemes, Finer Grained Proofs of Retrievability (FG-PoR) and More Lightweight Proofs of Retrievability (ML-PoR), which are both based on the Nyberg-Rueppel signature scheme. The execution processes of FG-PoR consist of the following six steps. Before describing the execution processes, we first give a definition for FG-PoR scheme.
Definition 2.
A FG-PoR scheme built on the six algorithms (KeyGen, TagSigGen, RespGen, VeriResp, VeriHash, RetrData) can guarantee data possession. Also, it can recover each data block of all chunks of the evidence file.
Key Generation
The CMA runs the KeyGen( ) algorithm to generate key pair ( , ) pk sk . Chooses two primes p and q , q is a factor of 
Tags and Signatures Generation
Given evidence blocks 
The tags set may be expressed in the following matrix form
The CMA sends the set of evidence blocks and metadata of the evidence file on its own storage. The storage distribution of the electronic evidence blocks and their tags on the CSS of the ASA is given in Figure 3 . 
Challenge Choice
After the CMA has sent challenge values to the CPA, and the CPA has given back response values to the CMA, the CMA will check the integrity of all evidence blocks by the response values. The challenge values are 
Response Generation
The CPA runs the RespGen( ) to generate response values to prove that the ASA is still preserve all evidence blocks intact. The ASA has held evidence blocks 
The 
If the above equation is true, the verify algorithm returns 1, the CMA believes that the ASA preserves well evidence blocks set B . Otherwise, the verify algorithm returns 0.
The above equation holds because: H is calculated as following
The ERA runs VeriHash( ) algorithm to compare the set of hash values
, which has been saved in Section 4. 
In fact , , 
More Lightweight Proofs of Retrievability (ML-PoR)
We modify FG-PoR scheme to attain a More Lightweight Proofs of Retrievability (ML-PoR) scheme. It consists of the following six steps, but it has a weaker recovery guarantee than FG-PoR. We give a definition for ML-PoR scheme that is described as follows.
Definition 3.
A ML-PoR scheme built on the six algorithms (KeyGen, TagSigGen, RespGen, VeriResp, VeriHash, RetrData) can guarantee data possession, and it can recover each chunk of the evidence file.
Key Generation
Key generation is the same as FG-PoR, and the secret key is 1 { , } sk x k  and the public key is { , , , } pk p q g y  .
Tags and Signatures Generation
Let ( ) f  be a pseudo-random function, the CMA uses secret key 1 k to derive random sequence
Given the evidence blocks , ,
The CMA runs the TagSigGen( ) algorithm to create a tag and a signature for each j B as
Further, the CMA computes hash value for each column of evidence matrix B as ,1
( || ||, ,|| )
Here, the storage distribution of the electronic evidence blocks and their tags on the CSS of the ASA is shown in Figure 4 . B to get
The ERA runs VeriHash( ) algorithm to compare the set of hash values ' 1 ' { } 
, ,
When some data blocks have been lost in the ASA, FG-PoR can recover each data block of evidence matrix, but ML-PoR can only recover a column of evidence matrix. only needs to check for 460 random blocks of the file so as to detect sever misbehavior with probability larger than 99%. So we choose 460 c  to achieve a high probability of assurance. From Table 1 , we know the communication costs in [11] (Section 6) are the highest in the five schemes. Moreover, the communication costs of all schemes are much lower than computation costs and storage costs. The computation costs of tags and signatures generation have slight impact on the overall system performance, because the generation task of tags and signatures is completed only once during the files life time, which may be many years. Therefore, we only consider computation costs of response generation, computation costs of response verification, and storage costs of file blocks and tags.
To achieve more intuitive and clear directions, we count computation costs of response generation and computation costs of response verification. Also, the sum is called computation costs of response generation and verification. Here, computation costs are running times of the operation in Table 1 . In our implementation, the computation times of response generation and verification of DEMC-PDP [10] , PEMC-PDP [10] , [11] (Section 6), FG-PoR, and ML-PoR are 8388,623.63 ms, 724.79 ms, 254,200.72 ms, 279,620.18 ms and 698.56 ms. The comparison result of computation costs of the five schemes are shown in Figure 5 . Figure 5 indicates computation costs of DEMC-PDP [10] are apparently higher than the other four schemes. This was due to the fact that DEMC-PDP [10] and PEMC-PDP [10] store multi-copies of the file to the server; moreover, DEMC-PDP [10] depends on checking by validating all file blocks. To [11] (Section 6), computation costs of response generation and verification are slightly lower than our FG-PoR scheme. The communication costs of PEMC-PDP [10] and ML-PoR are roughly equivalent and are much lower than the other three schemes.
The storage costs are storage space of file blocks, tags, signatures and coding. In our implementation, the storage space of file blocks and tags DEMC-PDP [10] , PEMC-PDP [10] , [11] (Section 6), FG-PoR, and ML-PoR are 25,600,000 Kbits, 13,440,000 Kbits, 673,220 Kbits, 1280,000 Kbits and 640,800 Kbits. The comparison result of storage costs of file blocks and tags of the five schemes are shown in Figure 6 . From Figure 6 , we know that the storage costs of file blocks and tags of DEMC-PDP [10] and PEMC-PDP [10] are apparently higher than the other three schemes, and the storage costs of DEMC-PDP [10] are highest in all schemes. The storage costs of [11] (Section 6) and ML-PoR are roughly equivalent; moreover, the storage costs of ML-PoR are lowest in all schemes.
In five schemes, only [11] (Section 6) uses the technologies of encoding and decoding. The [11] (Section 6) first applies the erasure codes to encode the file, and then splits encoded file into n m  sectors. It provides provable data possession and data recovery dual functions, but its erasure of codes adds extra computation costs and storage costs, so the total costs of [11] (Section 6) are higher than our FG-PoR and ML-PoR. DEMC-PDP [10] and PEMC-PDP [10] use multi-replication technology to achieve provable data possession and data recovery functions, but storage costs are too high. Also, the computation costs of DEMC-PDP [10] are the highest of the five schemes. Our ML-PoR generates only a tag to each row of evidence matrix, rather than generating a tag to each element of evidence matrix. Therefore, it reduces computation costs and storage costs compared to that of the FG-PoR. In overall performance, ML-PoR is superior to the other four schemes.
Conclusions
Proofs of Retrievability (PoR) to cloud storage data are mainly based on multi-replication technology and erasure code technology [19] . PoR based on multi-replication technology is required to create some copies of the same size for each data block, so the server needs to provide extra storage space for these copies, such as in the schemes in [9, 10] . PoR based on erasure code technology needs to blend some data blocks into less redundant blocks, so it saves storage space, but the encoding and the decoding operation add computation costs, such as in the schemes in [8, 11] . This paper proposes two PoR schemes-FG-PoR and ML-PoR-for the storage of electronic evidence in the cloud. The two PoR schemes do not use multi-replication technology or erasure code technology, and the two technologies are replaced by employing verification tags and signatures. Therefore, FG-PoR and ML-PoR have lower computation costs and storage costs than other similar schemes. Moreover, they not only can ensure the integrity of electronic evidence, but also provide a robust evidence recovery guarantee.
